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MERMAIDS RIDING ALLIGATORS:
DIVIDED COMMAND ON THE
SOUTHERN FRONTIER, 1776-1778
by W. C ALVIN SMITH *

remark that war was too imG portant a matter to oft-quoted
entrust to the military simply put into
EORGE

CLEMENCEAU'S

words a thought prevalent in the western civil mind at least since
the days of the Roman Republic. The obverse, that politics is too
vital a business to be left to politicians, is equally true in the
western military mind but less-often spoken.1 For a general to
utter these words would bring immediate accusations of a
“Caesar-complex” or worse. That twentieth-century playwrights
would permit such a statement only from a power-mad, insanelyobsessed general, such as Jack Ripper in the production, Dr.
Strangelove, testifies to the above circumstance.
Nowhere in western society were such beliefs more actualized
than in British constitutionalism of the eighteenth century. A
good deal of political philosophy on both sides of the “British
Lake,” i.e. Atlantic Ocean, condemned standing armies and the
union of civil and military authority. To the Anglo mind, military subordination to civilian control had become a sine qua non
of personal freedom and liberty in a properly governed state.
Building upon an image of an Anglo-Saxon utopia of free-holding militia corrupted by Norman feudalism and Stuart despotism, interpreters of England’s history had made British subjects
acutely conscious of inherent dangers in a military establishment
and strengthened their determination that generals should be on
tap, not on top.2
By the time of the American Revolution, this genuine fear of
military despotism had made Americans sensitive to the proper
civil-military relationships. In the colonial arrangement, the royal
governor was “Captain-General” and “Commander-in-Chief” with
*

Mr. Smith is associate professor of history, University of South Carolina,
Aiken Regional Campus, Aiken, South Carolina.

1. Don Higginbotham, The War of American Independence: Military Attitudes, Policies, and Practice, 1763-1789 (New York, 1971), 204-05.
2. Ibid., 13-14.
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an important role in colonial defense. The “quest for power” of
the lower houses of assembly on the eve of revolution led colonists in rebellion to believe that civil control meant legislative
control, with the legislature advising the governor on his military power even when the governor had ideas of military glory
all his own. Transposed to the Continental scene, this assembly
attitude generated suspicion of the army almost as soon as it was
established. Congress, the national legislature, kept close watch
on its military creation, and the recurrent friction between that
body and General Washington is open knowledge. For its part,
the Continental military was equally annoyed by the attitudes
and controls of the civil authority. In the dark days of Valley
Forge and again in the final months of the war, the army felt
neglected— or worse— by the national legislature.3
Given this mood of mutual suspicion on the Continental
level, it comes as no surprise that dissension and even distrust
should prevail on the provincial level between the Continental
army and state officials. Here, Continental officers had to contend
with a civil authority that not only regarded the army as potentially dangerous, but also had its own citizen-soldiers in the
Anglo tradition to offset reliance on the Continental establishment if need be. Further, within some states, such as Georgia, the
personal jealousies and rivalries between contending citizens,
some who headed the military establishment and others who
headed the civil establishment, amplified the inherent suspicion,
making distrust personal and vindictive.4 With a determination
that the military should be strictly subordinated to civil power,
these states barred military official from assembly seats and state
office.5
Since American civil-military suspicion was born of the
British Constitution, the Revolution likewise revealed a continuing jealousy and distrust between the king’s generals and his
governors. Although royal governors, constantly requested troops
for protection, they were never willing to yield their military
authority as commander in chief to the generals. Indeed, the most
3. Ibid., 17-18, 209.
4. E. Merton Coulter, Georgia, A Short History, 3rd rev. ed. (Chapel Hill,
1960), 134-35, 151-52.
5. Kenneth Coleman, The American Revolution In Georgia, 1763-1789
(Athens, 1958), 80; Higginbotham, War of American Independence, 206.
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certain governors, such as Patrick Tonyn of East Florida, would
acknowledge was a shared command.6 The generals of His Majesty’s forces, on the other hand, were apt to regard royal governors as exclusively civil, even denying to them control over
their provincial militia in a massive war like the American rebellion. For the most part, in the professional general’s view, the
governor could not be considered a superior in war councils, and
was only occasionally regarded as an equal.7
The foregoing situations prevailed in Georgia and East Florida respectively during the Revolution and added measurably to
an understanding of divided command on both sides, revealing its
sources and the tactical difficulties arising from it. In addition,
these circumstances explain why two neighboring provinces,
which sought security in the subordination of one another, were
never able to achieve that security in the period between 1776
and 1778. Only when the full might of the British army, upon
coordination by its civil head in England, turned south late in
1778 did the situations in Georgia and Florida alter drastically.
An astute observer might have predicted a severe civil-military
quarrel in both patriot Georgia and loyalist East Florida once
acquainted with particular individuals who would play the roles
of governor and general. In Georgia, deciding just who would fill
those roles provoked a continuing controversy when patriots attempted to bring organization to their emerging independence.
Dissension occurred in the selection of personnel to command
Georgia’s battalion of the army authorized by Congress.8 Competing for command were Lachlan McIntosh and Button Gwinnett, each of whom represented different factions in Georgia
politics. The Savannah elite, reluctant in rebellion because of
family relationships, comprised McIntosh’s primary support,
6. Higginbotham, War of American Independence, 16-17; Paul H. Smith,
Loyalists and Redcoats: A Study in British Revolutionary Policy (New
York, 1972), 89-90, 127-28; Patrick Tonyn to Augustine Prevost, December 24, 1777, in Great Britain, Public Record Office, British Headquarters (Sir Guy Carleton) Papers, 1747-1783. Microfilm copies of these 107
volumes are located in the South Carolina Department of Archives and
History building in Columbia. Hereinafter cited as BHQP.
7. Augustine Prevost to William Howe, September 9, 1776, April 5, 1778,
in Great Britain, Historical Manuscripts Commission, Report on American Manuscripts in the Royal Institution of Great Britain, 4 vols. (London, 1904-1909), I, 58, 223-24.
8. Allen D. Candler, comp., The Revolutionary Records of the State of
Georgia, 3 vols. (Atlanta, 1908), I, 305-06.
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whereas, transplanted New England Congregationalists of Midway
and Sunbury, relatively new in Georgia politics, composed Gwinnett’s following.9 In January 1776, the Provincial Congress of the
state finally gave the Continental commands to McIntosh and his
friends and dispatched Gwinnett to the Continental Congress in
hopes of avoiding a patriot rupture.10 In the long run, their action contributed to the dissension. It gave one faction command
of the Continental forces and provided the other an edge in assuming control of the state government following the Declaration
of Independence.11
In East Florida, meantime, the crown had filled the offices of
governor and general in the traditional manner unencumbered
by the politics of revolution. Nevertheless, the personalities and
pride of individuals here also created a situation seeded with
future dissension. Patrick Tonyn had assumed his post as governor of East Florida barely two weeks prior to the introduction
of the Coercive Acts in Parliament. An army officer who had
served in Europe during the Great War for the Empire, Tonyn
had requested and obtained the governorship from Lord Dartmouth in 1773. He also retained his military commission and
undoubtedly took most seriously his authority and prerogatives
as captain-general and governor-in-chief.12 The new governor
preferred his own councils and hesitated to call an assembly,
thereby promoting the development of a small, noisesome opposition faction. Tonyn accused it of being pro-American, but his
9.

Ibid.; Joseph Clay to [?], September 16, 1775, Joseph Clay Papers, Georgia
Historical Society, Savannah; Charles Francis Jenkins, Button Gwinnett,
Signer of the Declaration of Independence (Garden City, New York,
1926), 95-96.
10. Georgia Gazette, February 7, 1776; Coleman, American Revolution in
Georgia, 95.
11. Coleman, American Revolution in Georgia, 95, 98; Journal of Council,
August 30, 1776, Archibald Bulloch Proclamation, July 1776, in Candler,
Revolutionary Records, I, 194-95, 280-81, 305-06; Jenkins, Button Gwinnett, 95-96, 98-101. The edge became apparent when Gwinnett and his
followers returned to Georgia in the summer of 1776 armed with the
Declaration and a charge from Congress to frame a constitution for
Georgia.
12. Charles Loch Mowat, East Florida As A British Province, 1763-1784
(Berkeley, 1943; facsimile edition, Gainesville, 1964), 83. Leonard Woods
Labaree, Royal Government In America: A Study of the British Colonial
System before 1783 (New Haven, 1930; facsimile edition, New York,
1958), discusses the personalities and occupation types usually chosen by
the British for American governorships. See chapter two, especially pages
37-43.
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most serious troubles with this opposition came from its nourishing the antagonism between Tonyn and the regular British troops
stationed in St. Augustine as the American conflict unfolded.13
Those troops had been small in number, about ninety-eight
men and twenty-four officers, until the transfer of additional
forces to East Florida during 1776. The increase consisted primarily of the 60th Foot Regiment, recruited from England and
Hanover and commanded by a capable career-man, Colonel, later
14
Roughly coinciding with the arGeneral, Augustine Prevost.
rival of Prevost, Tonyn, anxious about the safety of his province,
formed a special force of loyalist refugees into a provincial corps
dubbed the East Florida Rangers. Its commander, Thomas
Brown, received a commission as lieutenant colonel from General Thomas Gage and reported directly to Tonyn at the governor’s insistence.15 The existence of this corps fed dissension in
East Florida in the same manner that the McIntosh-Gwinnett
dispute spurred it in Georgia. In consequence of such discord, the
likelihood of one side conquering the other on the southern
frontier was less real than imagined in the period 1776 to 1778,
although each proclaimed the danger great and continually
planned the subjugation of the other.
Their efforts began early. In January 1776, the Continental
Congress harkened to suggestions from Georgia and recommended to North and South Carolina, and to Georgia, the capture of St. Augustine .16 Before any action followed this proposal,
however, the South found itself the scene of an intended British
invasion by sea. Governor Tonyn and the loyalist refugees in
East Florida eagerly designed an invasion of Georgia and the
Carolinas to coincide with General Henry Clinton’s assault
against Charleston. The governor felt he could lead a combined
expedition of regulars, Indians, and refugees that would easily re13. Mowat, East Florida, 86-97, 101. In truth, the opposition was more
nuisance than threat, but Tonyn hated its leaders for friendliness to the
regular officers who did not think him their military equal.
14. Ibid., 107-08.
15. Ibid., 110; Gary D. Olson, “Thomas Brown, Loyalist Partisan, and the
Revolutionary War in Georgia, 1777-1782,” Georgia Historical Quarterly,
LIV (Spring 1970), 2, 17n. Brown, an outspoken loyalist, had been forced
to flee the Carolina backcountry in 1775.
16. Resolution of January 1, 1776, suggesting conquest of St. Augustine, in
Worthington Chauncey Ford, ed., Journals of the Continental Congress,
1774-1789, 34 vols. (Washington, 1904-1937) IV, 15.
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store these provinces to the crown.17 Tonyn’s project does not appear to have been taken seriously. It seems ludicrous since the full
contingent of regulars had not yet arrived in St. Augustine, and
Tonyn was having difficulty protecting the border with Georgia.
Still, the governor’s proposal was not fully tested since Clinton’s
repulse at Charleston ended Tonyn’s schemes temporarily and
gave the initiative to the Georgians who now planned the conquest of St. Augustine.
In June 1776, the Georgia Council of Safety dispatched a committee to Charleston to request support for an invasion from
General Charles Lee, Continental commander in the Southern
Military Department. Lee, ready to capitalize on his good fortune
in the South, listened sympathetically and agreed to come to
Savannah for an inspection in August.18
When he arrived, Lee found Georgia weak, defenseless, and
incapable of mounting the supply and transport necessary to
capture St. Augustine. Rejecting an immediate attempt to reduce
the British stronghold, which he had tentatively considered
earlier, Lee recommended the establishment of a series of forts
and mounted patrols to contain raiding from East Florida, the
only threat then apparent to Georgia’s security.19 The council
wished to launch a full-scale invasion of Florida anyway and
countered Lee’s doubts concerning supply with declarations of
the bountiful provisions in the countryside. Stating that plunder
along the march would supply the invading force, the council
urged Lee to lead an expedition and noted that the civilians, at
least, were “hearty and ready” to help reduce East Florida.20
While Lee and the Georgia council debated policy, parties of
militia and Continentals under McIntosh destroyed a British outpost on the St. Marys and threw the settlements between that
river and the St. Johns into disarray. Lee believed their ac17. Olson, “Thomas Brown,” 1-2; Mowat, East FLorida, 108-10, 118; Coleman,
American Revolution in Georgia, 100-01; Tonyn to Henry Clinton, February 13, 15, 1776, Henry Clinton Papers, William L. Clements Library,
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.
18. Journal of Council, June 19, 20, 21, 25, July 1, 2, 5, 1776, Candler, Revolutionary Records, I, 139-40, 140-43, 143-44, 144-47, 147-48, 148-50, 150-54;
John R. Alden, General Charles Lee, Traitor or Patriot? (Baton Rouge,
1951), 131-32.
19. Olson, “Thomas Brown,” 3; Alden, General Charles Lee, 132.
20. Journal of Council, August 19, 20, 1776, Candler, Revolutionary Records,
I, 181-83.
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complishment sufficient to protect Georgia, and he expressed to
the council in late August 1776 his conviction that too few cannon, forces, and provisions existed to besiege St. Augustine at
this time.21 The council remained adamant. It insisted that overcrowding would force surrender of the fort in St. Augustine,
which would win over the Indians, stop slave runaways, and end
all future raids from Florida.22 Lee, equally immovable, now considered the Georgians completely impractical and “harum
skarum” in their planning. He confided to his deputy, General
John Armstrong: “They [the councillors] will propose anything,
and after they have propos’d it, discover that they are incapable
of performing the least. . . . Upon the whole I shou’d not be
surpris’d if they were to propose mounting a body of Mermaids
on Alligators.“23
Exasperated by the council and the lack of material, Lee saw
little hope for a successful expedition against St. Augustine, and
he continually advised defensive measures only. The council
ignored Lee’s advice and began collecting boats for an insistedupon expedition, which finally came in early September. When
the main body of the invading force, in Lee’s opinion only a raiding party, reached Sunbury, thirty miles from Savannah, the commander decided to turn back because of bad weather, lack of
transports, and the increase of the garrison at St. Augustine.24 In
truth, Lee had not undertaken a strong invasion since he had already received orders from Congress to return to the North, and
he was glad to be rescued from an impossible situation. The
angry Georgians of course blamed Lee for the failure and began
contemplating future expeditions against St. Augustine.25
Although the anger and division in Georgia’s first attempted
21. Journal of Council, August 19, 1776, Candler, Revolutionary Records, I,
179-82; Coleman, American Revolution in Georgia, 101.
22. Journal of Council, August 19, 1776, Candler, Revolutionary Records, I,
179-82.
23. Charles Lee to John Armstrong, August 27, 1776, quoted in Coleman,
American Revolution in Georgia, 97; Alden, General Charles Lee, 132.
24. Journal of Council, August 24, 28, 1776, Candler, Revolutionary Records,
I, 189, 190-93: Alden, General Charles Lee, 132; Coleman, American Revolution in Georgia, 102. Colonel William Moultrie took field command
of this expedition, since Lee was already preparing to return to the
North. Mowat, East Florida, 119.
25. Alden, General Charles Lee, 132; Coleman, American Revolution in
Georgia, 102; Charles C. Jones, Jr., The History of Georgia, 2 vols. (Boston, 1883), II, 248-49.
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invasion made counter-measures in Florida almost unnecessary,
Governor Tonyn did not treat the attempt lightly. Convinced
that genuine danger existed in mid-summer 1776, the governor
requested regulars, supported by armed vessels, to take post on
the St. Marys and sought the aid of the Indians. When the
American raiding party under McIntosh arrived at the St. Marys
in August, the King’s forces retreated quickly, much to the dismay and disgust of Tonyn, who characterized the attacking force
as “inconsiderable.“26 Colonel Prevost disagreed with Tonyn and
defended the regulars’ falling back from a river impossible to
defend without adequate naval force in the face of a “strong”
party of rebels. Tonyn thereupon decided to authorize his East
Florida Rangers to provide him with intelligence and to conduct
counter-raids into Georgia since the regulars, in the governor’s
view, were neither willing nor able to perform this function.27
Annoyed, Prevost reported the situation to the British commander in chief in America, General Sir William Howe, and requested direct orders for the garrison in East Florida to avoid de28
pending “entirely” upon “a Civil Governor and Council.“
By the fall of 1776, therefore, dissension revealed that military
operations on the southern frontier would not proceed smoothly
on either side. For the Americans, disagreement between state
authorities and the Continental Army officers concerning command and policy meant that two heads, not one, would be issuing orders. The civil head based its reasoning on purely political considerations, such as the good effect the capture of St.
Augustine would have on patriots. The military head considered
primarily issues of armaments, supply, and tactics in reaching its
decisions. Unless one or the other voluntarily yielded, chances of
capturing East Florida were slim. For the British, command
would be less divided. The home government could always intervene and combine questions of politics and tactics. Nevertheless,
the existence of an independent provincial corps under the exclusive authority of a civil governor galled the British military
in St. Augustine and would continue to do so until higher au26. Howe to Tonyn, August 25, 1776, Tonyn to Howe, February 24, 1778,
Report on American Manuscripts, I, 56-57, 198.
27. Prevost to Howe, September 9, 1776, Tonyn to Howe, February 24, 1778,
Report on American Manuscripts, I, 58, 198.
28. Prevost to Howe, September 9, 1776, Report on American Manuscripts, I,
58.
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thority ruled on this issue. The likelihood that either Americans
or British would quash their dissension appeared remote as each
anticipated invasion of the other in 1777.
In January, Tonyn and Prevost discussed the supply problem
in East Florida and the possibility of foraging expeditions in
southern Georgia to replenish food stores in St. Augustine. Convinced that East Florida could not provide sufficient sustenance
for its refugee-and-troop-increased population, Governor Tonyn
believed the solution lay in cattle raids across the St. Marys. He
demanded action accordingly. Prevost, doubtful of the productivity of such excursions, contended that the garrison was too
small to risk on cattle raids.29 Tonyn proved insistent, however,
pointing out that his ranger corps knew the woods well and could
move rapidly, although it would need some assistance from regulars. At length, Prevost relented.30
The invading force, consisting of regulars, rangers, and a band
of Creeks crossed into Georgia in February 1777. Shortly, Lieutenant Colonel Brown and his forces captured Fort McIntosh, a
Georgia stockade on the Satilla River eighty miles south of the
Altamaha. Immediately, additional regulars under Colonel Lewis
Füser moved up for a combined advance against Fort Howe on
the Altamaha. When Georgia Continentals, led by General McIntosh, advanced to halt the British, Füser retired, burned Fort
McIntosh, and returned to St. Augustine with 2,000 head of cattle. 31
The success of the raid, which for a moment had given evidence of a real assault, was marred by dissension between regulars
and rangers. Füser, displaying a professional’s disdain, referred to
the rangers as plunderers and the Indians as boys. According to
Brown’s complaint to Tonyn, Füser’s insults and mistreatment of
both rangers and Indians made it unlikely that either would cooperate with him in the future.32
As Tonyn prepared to take up this complaint with Prevost,
the Georgians, though unsure if the raid had been only a prelude to a larger attack, attempted to organize a counter-thrust.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Olson, “Thomas Brown,” 3-4; Mowat, East Florida, 119-20.
Mowat, East Florida, 120; Tonyn to Prevost, December 24, 1777, BHQP;
Tonyn to Howe, February 24, 1778, Report on American Manuscripts, I,
197-99.
Olson, “Thomas Brown,” 3-4.
Mowat, East Florida, 120.
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The Council of Safety gave its president emergency power, called
out the militia, and requested aid from General Robert Howe,
Lee’s successor as Continental commander of the Southern De33
partment. Arriving in Georgia from Charleston, General Howe
found the civil authorities planning to advance against St. Augustine. Their proposal to do so stunned Howe as he noted the weak
condition of Georgia defenses and the lack of preparation for a
successful invasion.34 Georgia’s council president, Button Gwinnett, who had recently attained this position following his return from the Continental Congress, demanded an attack. Further, he determined to lead it himself as Georgia commander in
chief both to ensure subordination of the military and to demonstrate his own abilities in the field.35
Gwinnett had early perceived the opportunity available to
political newcomers in a revolution and had never quite forgiven the Savannah leadership for denying him military command of the Georgia Battalion in 1776. Now he moved to reverse that circumstance, bring the Continentals officered by his
opponents to heel under his authority, and prepare the way for
him to become Georgia’s first elected governor. In this fashion,
revolutionary democracy would permit an individual, characterized by the old elite as unfit for high office because of his rank
and “situation in life,” to rise to the highest position in a sovereign state.36
Yet, the key to all Gwinnett’s plans remained a successful invasion of Florida to publicize his abilities, and it appeared unlikely that the Continentals would willingly serve his ambition.
Certainly, Howe would not. The general refused to commit any
Continentals from South Carolina for a foolhardy expedition. He

33. Joseph Clay to John Burnley, February 24, 1777, in Collections of the
Georgia Historical Society, 15 vols. (Savannah, 1840-date), VIII, 20-21;
Journal of Council, February 21, 1777, Candler, Revolutionary Records, I,
224-25; Jones, History of Georgia, II, 263.
34. Coleman, American Revolution in Georgia, 103.
35. Ibid., 88; Jones, History of Georgia, II, 264.
36. Jenkins, Button Gwinnett, 28, 60, 128, 150-52; Joseph Clay to Bright and
Pechin, July 2, 1777, in Collections of the Georgia Historical Society,
VIII, 34-36. For opinions on Gwinnett’s ambition and revolutionary
democracy, see various letters of Joseph Clay (supra) and also Samuel
Elbert to Lachlan McIntosh, September 23, 1776, Ferdinand Julius
Dreer Autograph Collection, Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia.
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soon returned to Charleston with an opinion of Georgia’s civil
leaders no better than that of his predecessor.37
Angry, but undaunted, Gwinnett pushed ahead with his plans.
He pointed out to the council that Howe’s leaving Georgia emphasized the danger of giving power to the military and insisted
that all orders and decisions for the Georgia Continentals, as well
as the militia, should come from civil authority. Gwinnett then
called out the militia for an invasion that would snub the Continentals and particularly embarrass General McIntosh. He also
ordered the arrest of the general’s brother on a trumped-up
charge of treason.38
Gwinnett’s action astonished the military, which had earlier
tried to clarify the chain of command. All the Continental
officers in Georgia had pledged in 1776 to obey orders of the
Council of Safety when not in conflict with the Continental Congress. In addition, General McIntosh had requested General
Washington to instruct him on the degree of control state authorities had over Continental troops.39
Still, no satisfactory arrangement had been reached respecting
state authority and the Continental establishment when Gwinnett
planned his expedition. The council, annoyed by Howe and
swayed by Gwinnett, agreed to use only militia. So few militia responded, however, that by the end of March 1777, the council
at last called upon the Georgia Battalion, but not Howe, for assistance. Much to the consternation of McIntosh, Gwinnett
wanted the Continentals merely to carry out the plans he had
already made, not help in formulating new ones.40 Those plans
called for Georgia forces to gather at Sunbury, depart by different
routes, and rendezvous at Sawpit Bluff near the St. Johns River
at the end of May.41
By mid-April, the combined forces had arrived at Sunbury
where McIntosh and Gwinnett could no longer avoid an open
37. Coleman, American Revolution in Georgia, 103.
38. Jones, History of Georgia, II, 264-65; Coleman, American Revolution in
Georgia, 103-04.
39. McIntosh to Washington, February 16, 1776, in George White, Historical
Collections of Georgia. . . (New York, 1854), 92-93.
40. Jones, History of Georgia, II, 265; McIntosh to Howe, April 2, 1777, in
Lilla M. Hawes, ed., “The Papers of Lachlan McIntosh, 1774-1799,” Part
III, Georgia Historical Quarterly, XXXVIII (December 1954), 365; Robert Howe to a friend in Georgia, May 29, 1777, Revolutionary Collection,
William R. Perkins Library, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina.
41. Olson, “Thomas Brown,” 4.
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confrontation. The general insisted upon leading the Continentals as the ranking officer and required the militia to coordinate
its efforts with his troops. Gwinnett would not hear of such a
scheme, and he insisted that as superior authority in the state, he
should command the entire force. Each man called separate
councils of war and criticized the interference of the other. At
length, with the expedition stalled, both men followed the Council of Safety’s suggestion to return to Savannah and leave Colonel
Samuel Elbert, the next ranking Continental officer, in charge of
the troops.42
Elbert accepted the command, perplexed as to whom to obey.
Gwinnett soon sent orders from Savannah to continue the expedition, but Elbert deferred to his Continental commander and
begged instructions. Resigned to the dilemma, McIntosh advised
Elbert to proceed cautiously. Unquestionably, he warned, the
enemy had been alerted by the long delay and dissension.43 Indeed the enemy had. News of the invasion prompted countermeasures by the British, and Governor Tonyn hurried to protect
his province.. The governor, more anxious than Prevost, wrote
directly to British agents among the Creeks and Cherokees for
assistance. He urged agent David Tate to bring the Lower Creeks
at once to St. Augustine and send the Upper Creeks and Cherokees on the warpath into the Georgia-Carolina backcountry.44
In his excitement, Tonyn exaggerated the danger; but he was not
alone in his fear of this invasion, since not a few citizens of St.
Augustine spoke of capitulation to the enemy.45
Prevost did not share this hurried, almost frantic, response to
invasion. He agreed with Tonyn on the necessity for action but
saw no immediacy required until the Americans should reach the
St. Johns. Further, he felt the use of Indians to “harrass and distress a few perhaps innocent people” pointless. The Indians, as-

42. Coleman, American Revolution in Georgia, 104; Jones, History of
Georgia, II, 265-67; “Papers respecting the Augustine Expendition in
April 1777,” in Lilla M. Hawes, ed., “The Papers of Lachlan McIntosh,
1774-1799,” Part IV, Georgia Historical Quarterly, XXXIX (March
1955), 63-65.
43. Elbert to McIntosh, April 24, 1777, in Collections of the Georgia Historical Society, V, Part 2, 19; McIntosh to Elbert, April 26, 1777, in
Hawes, “The Papers of Lachlan McIntosh, 1774-1799,” Part III, 368.
44. Tonyn to David Tate, April 20, 1777, BHQP.
45. Mowat, East Florida, 120.
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serted Prevost, should be used only in conjuction with large operations. 46
Nor did the colonel wish to rely on independent rangers to
keep Indian raiders in check. He and the governor had already
clashed on this subject in an examination of Brown’s complaint
against Füser following the Fort McIntosh action in February.
Subsequently, Prevost had requested, and had been denied, persumably for economy, permission from General William Howe to
form his own corps of mounted rangers.47 Howe, who desired a
“perfect good understanding” between the military and the civil
power in Florida, cautioned both parties against dissension in the
different branches of the king’s service.48 Yet, the tone of his correspondence shared Prevost’s view regarding the use of Indians,
and he advised Tonyn to “sandwich” the Indians in between
groups of militia and regulars to oppose the invaders “should
they reach the St. John’s.“49
In mid-May, an advance party of militia from the divided and
confused Georgia invasion reached Nassau Creek between the St.
Marys and the St. Johns where it met and was defeated by a small
combined force of regulars, rangers, and Indians. Major James
Mark Prevost, the colonel’s brother, commanded the regulars on
this occasion. Though he praised Brown, Major Prevost evidently
complained that the Indians would have massacred prisoners had
not the regulars prevented them, implying that the rangers could
not control their allies.50 Consequently, Colonel Prevost, promoted to brigadier in command of all troops in East and West
Florida at the time of the invasion, warned Tonyn again of
Indian behavior and began to demand control of the East Florida
Rangers as well. Tonyn steadfastly refused to yield to the general’s pressure, intimating that to do so would jeopardize the
constitution and throw civilians into consternation at the prospect of unchecked military rule. Galled by Tonyn’s exaggerated

46. Prevost to John Stuart, June 14, 1777, BHQP.
47. Howe to Prevost, July 14, 1777, Prevost to Howe, November 1, 1777, Report on American Manuscripts, I, 124, 147-48.
48. Howe to Governor Chester, January 20, 1777, Report on American Manuscripts, I, 84; Howe to Tonyn, May 4, 1777, to Prevost, May 3, 1777,
BHQP.
49. Howe to Tonyn, May 12, 1777, BHQP.
50. Mowat, East Florida, 120-21.
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position, Prevost could only beg Howe to assist him in gaining
control over that “truly independent corps of Rangers.“51
While the governor and the general in East Florida continued
their bickering until a higher-up should put an end to it, their
Georgia counterparts determined upon a more drastic resolution
of their differences. The Elbert-led Gwinnett expedition had
reached Amelia Narrows when it learned of the reversal of the
Georgia militia by Major Prevost and Lieutenant Colonel Brown.
Although the Georgian boasted he could have made “the whole
Province of East Florida tumble,” he decided to abandon the invasion, claiming that the militia’s defeat had altered the situation
and left the state defenseless.52 Actually, the entire effort had
been conceived by ambition and jealousy and had been wrecked
by dissension between the civil and military branches before it
began. Elbert’s withdrawal was no more than the belated announcement of this much earlier failure to unify command.
The contending parties showed no disposal to rectify that
failure in the subsequent investigation of the aborted invasion by
Georgia’s first assembly under its new constitution. Instead, each
attempted to fix the blame upon the other. The Gwinnett party
castigated General McIntosh for not yielding command to the
council president; but the general insisted that Gwinnett’s jealousy and ambition were at fault. McIntosh countered suggestions
of incompetence with the assertion that Gwinnett had tried to
create confusion in the army because Continental command had
been denied him.53 When the assembly voiced its approval of
Gwinnett’s conduct, the general forced the issue by publicly calling Gwinnett “a Scoundrell & lying Rascal.” As expected, the
erstwhile council president demanded “the satisfaction accorded a
gentleman” before sunrise on May 16, 1777.54
On that morning, the two men with their seconds met in a
51. Ibid.; Howe to Prevost, April 1, May 4, 1777, to Tonyn, May 4, 1777,
Prevost to Howe, November 1, 1777, March 21, 1778, Report on American
Manuscripts, I, 100, 107, 147-48, 216; Prevost to Tonyn, December 20,
1777, Tonyn to Prevost, December 24, 1777, BHQP.
52. Elbert to Joseph Habersham, May 30, 1777, Collections of the Georgia
Historical Society, V, Part 2, 33-34; Jones, History of Georgia, II, 268-69.
53. Coleman, American Revolution in Georgia, 89; McIntosh to Henry
Laurens, May 30, 1777, William G. Simms Collection of Laurens Papers,
South Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina, Columbia.
Simms Collection hereinafter cited as WGSC.
54. Jenkins, Button Gwinnett, 152; Candler, Revolutionary Records, I, 306;
McIntosh to Laurens, May 30, 1777, WGSC.
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pasture outside Savannah and agreed to exchange a single shot
each from a distance of roughly twelve feet. Both fired at the
same time and both found their mark— the other’s leg! The duelists then shook hands, declared honor satisfied, and left the field.55
The nature of their duel demonstrated that they were apparently
willing to end their quarrel with honor but without serious injury, a circumstance that could have cleared the air for future
cooperation between civil and military authorities. Unhappily,
Gwinnett’s wound did not heal. A few days after the duel, he
died, a victim of gangrene, resulting from a combination of hot
weather, shattered bone, and poor medical care.56
The dead man’s friends, thoroughly dismayed by the turn of
events, determined to avenge their champion by having McIntosh
cashiered from the army. They circulated petitions asking Congress to remove the general for dueling in violation of the articles
of war. In the assembly, they attempted to take complete control
of the army and encouraged new recruits to demonstrate against
officers who engaged in dueling.57
McIntosh, unwilling to resign yet ready to end a bad situation
that threatened to destroy the Georgia Battalion, submitted to a
trial. The jury acquitted him, but Gwinnett’s friends would not
cease their disruption of the army. Finally, in an effort to end
rancor and save the state from ruin, the general’s associates requested George Washington to transfer McIntosh to Continental
58
army headquarters. Prior to his departure, McIntosh expressed
regret that no clear line of authority had been established to
protect the Continental army from the “interference” of state
authorities. Thereafter, a few thoughtful Georgians on both sides
began to wonder if the state could survive governors turned gen55. Jenkins, Button Gwinnett, 153-54; McIntosh to Laurens, May 30, 1777,
WGSC.
56. Jenkins, Button Gwinnett, 153-54.
57. McIntosh to George Walton, July 14, 1777, quoted in Jenkins, Button
Gwinnett, 256-62; McIntosh to Laurens, May 30, 1777, WGSC; Thomas
Gamble, Savannah Duels and Duellists, 1733-1877 (Savannah, 1923), 16;
Jenkins, Button Gwinnett, 159-61. Gwinnett’s friends hoped to force the
resignations of both McIntosh and his second, Colonel Joseph Habersham,
and gain mastery over the army. Since McIntosh was the challenged
party, however, he had not violated the articles of war. See Jenkins,
Button Gwinnett, 162-63.
58. Gamble, Savannah Duels, 16; Jenkins, Button Gwinnett, 167-68; Walton
to Washington, August 5, 1777, in Edmund C. Burnett, ed., Letters of
Members of the Continental Congress, 8 vols. (Washington, 1921-1938),
II, 439.
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eral and generals determined to preserve their independence of
state control.59 Regrettably, the number of such discerning persons was too small to force cooperation between the opposing
sides.
As Georgians shot at one another and arranged protective
transfers, Tonyn and Prevost continued their struggle for control
of the East Florida Rangers and, in their respective views, the
future of the province. Prevost, certain that as long as Tonyn
could send separate raiding parties into Georgia there could be
no coordinated policy for the southern frontier, repeatedly complained of the rangers’independence, lack of discipline, and the
high rank of their commander, Brown. As lieutenant colonel,
Brown outranked all the British officers in St. Augustine except
Füser and Prevost himself. Contending that regulars refused
orders from a non-professional who reported to the governor,
Prevost renewed his request to Tonyn for control of the rangers
as 1777 ended.60
The governor again remained steadfast. He answered Prevost
with an implication that the regulars were ignorant of the woods
and provincial warfare, yet agreed that when the rangers were in
combat with troops they were under Prevost’s command. On other
occasions, Tonyn asserted, knowing full well that his proposal was
unsatisfactory to Prevost, the general had only to express his
wishes to him and he would see them carried out.61 In this
fashion, with the British permitting a petty quarrel concerning a
small provincial corps to get out of hand, and the Georgians
divided into dueling civil and military factions, each side prepared for a third try against the other.
During the winter of 1777-1778, the Georgia assembly named
John Houstoun of Savannah to a term as governor. Neither a
member of the Gwinnett camp nor totally under the influence of
the Continental officers, he represented a compromise. Quarrelling should have abated. Yet, more than one person wondered
59. McIntosh to Laurens, May 30, 1777, WGSC; Joseph Clay to Edward
Telfair, August 10, 1777, Clay to Laurens, October 16, 1777, in Collections of the Georgia Historical Society, VIII, 37-38, 50.
60. Mowat, East Florida, 111; Prevost to Howe, June 14, November 1, 1777,
Report on American Manuscripts, I, 119-20, 147-48; Prevost to Tonyn,
December 20, 1777, BHQP.
61. Tonyn to Prevost, December 24, 1777, BHQP; Tonyn to Howe, February
24, 1778, Report on American Manuscripts, I, 197-99; Mowat, East Florida, 110.
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if this governor would play general also when the state requested
of General Howe what military operations had been ordered for
Georgia by “those in authority to the Northward.“62 Hardly had
the Continental commander pondered an answer to this query
when Tonyn’s rangers destroyed a small outpost on the Altamaha
River. Tonyn viewed their success as evidence of the ease with
which Georgia could be taken; but Prevost, interpreting the
rangers’ uncontrolled action negatively, predicted retaliation
from Georgia that would disrupt British military operations.63
The general proved correct. Stung by this insult, the Georgia
assembly voted emergency powers to Governor Houstoun, brushed
aside Howe’s objections to a Florida expedition, and vowed to
proceed against St. Augustine. The “Augustinia delenda est” zeal
of the assembly captivated Houstoun, who determined to accomplish what the Lee and Gwinnett invasions had failed to do.64
Unfortunately, he was in no better position to do so than they.
General Howe advised him that the Continentals lacked supplies
and troops to take St. Augustine and that the militia had farming
tasks to attend to. Nevertheless, Governor Houstoun persevered,
and Howe reluctantly agreed to a combined expedition. By the
end of April 1778, therefore, the Georgians had amassed nearly
2,000 troops for the attack on St. Augustine.65
Both Prevost and Tonyn in East Florida prepared for the invasion as intelligence reports reached St. Augustine. The immediate objective of the invading force appeared to be Fort
Tonyn, an outpost on the south side of the St. Marys, which the
rangers used as a rendezvous on their raids into Georgia.66 Tonyn,
in a rush, called upon Prevost to send regulars to reinforce Brown
at the outpost. Unperturbed, the general refused to send troops
62. Candler, Revolutionay Records, I, 324; Journal of Council, January 20,
1778, in ibid., II, 11; Clay to Telfair, August 10, 1777, Clay to Laurens,
October 16, 1777, Clay to Josiah Smith, Jr., spring 1778, in Collections of
the Georgia Historical Society, VIII, 37-38, 48-51, 69.
63. Brown to Tonyn, March 13, 1778, Tonyn to Howe, February 24, March
31, 1778, Prevost to Howe, March 21, 1778, Report on American Manuscripts, I, 209, 197-99, 221, 216.
64. Journal of Council, February 9, 1778, Candler, Revolutionary Records, II,
27; Journal of Council, April 16, 1778, ibid., 75-76; I, 324.
65. Coleman, American Revolution in Georgia, 106-07; Jones, History of
Georgia, II, 288-89; Journal of Council, April 16, 1778, Candler, Revolutionary Records, II, 75-77.
66. Brown to Prevost, April 10, 1778, Report on American Manuscripts, I,
227-28; Olson, “Thomas Brown,” 7, 17n.
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beyond the St. Johns. When pressed by the governor, Prevost
seized the occasion to gain mastery over the rangers. He would
send no officers of the king’s troops, he declared, to be commanded by Brown. Tonyn knew he was trapped. He yielded and
required Brown to submit to the orders of Major Glazier of the
regulars in this “alarming crisis.“67 Yet, the governor had no
thought of a permanent surrender to Prevost. He quickly dispatched a letter to General William Howe explaining the situation and blaming all the trouble on jealousy of Brown’s rank by
the majors in the regulars, particularly Major James Mark Prevost. The regular officers, thought Tonyn, were too proud to take
orders from a provincial, even when he had proved both his
loyalty and his ability.68
Tonyn had correctly pinpointed the source of irritation, as
Prevost admitted in his own correspondence to Howe. His Majesty’s officers simply would not serve under a young colonist who
had never seen service anywhere but in America. Furthermore,
defended Prevost, Brown’s independence of action and undisciplined behavior made him more a liability than an asset.69
With the matter now fully before the British commander in
America, the adversaries in Florida could await a permanent
solution while their temporary agreement allowed Prevost sole
command of the defense against the American invasion.
The invasion had not advanced far before it had generated the
familiar argument over command between the Georgia governor
and the ranking Continental officer. Unlike their enemy, they
could neither reach a temporary agreement nor await a permanent solution. The troops, made up of Continentals and militia
from Georgia and South Carolina, as well as naval units, had
progressed by alternate routes across the Altamaha towards the
St. Marys without unifying command. The Continentals, easier
to mobilize than the slower militia, arrived at the St. Marys first.
Upon their approach, the rangers destroyed Fort Tonyn and fell
back to the main body of British regulars at Alligator Bridge.
Presuming an advantage that did not exist, the Americans at67. Tonyn to Howe, May 1, 1778, Tonyn to Brown, April 18, 1778, Report
on American Manuscripts, I, 243-44, 234.
68. Tonyn to Howe, February 24, April 4, May 1, 1778, ibid., I, 197-99,
222-23, 243-44.
69. Prevost to Howe, April 5, 1778, to Clinton, September 25, 1778, ibid.,
I, 223-24, 302.
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tacked Major Prevost’s forces, then withdrew after several hours
70
to the ruins of Fort Tonyn to await the militia. In actuality, this
drawn battle of J une 30, 1778 proved the high point of the invasion.
Governor Houstoun and the Georgia militia reached the St.
Marys on July 4, 1778; the South Carolina militia finally arrived
a week later. Disappointment and dissension soon followed delay.
General Howe, the senior officer, demanded command by right;
Houstoun, though lacking experience, refused to be commanded.
Adding to the confusion, the South Carolina militia would take
no orders from the Continentals; and the naval commander, uncertain if the intra-coastal galleys were state or Continental, rejetted everyone’s authority. 71 Such entanglement could not be unsnarled since none was willing to yield to anyone.
Howe, convinced that delays and disagreement had cost the
initiative, confided to his officers of embarrassment “beyond expression” at bei ng required to rely upon men he could not command and called the present circumstance “one of the most unfortunate accide nts” in his life.72 Disgusted, and unwilling to
place Continent al officers under a state governor, Howe called a
war council and put to his officers the question: “Can the army,
whilst the comm and is divided, act with security, vigor, decision,
or benefit to the common cause?“73 The Continentals unanimously answered no and agreed to end the expedition. Incensed,
Governor Hous toun at first wanted to march the militia on to the
St. Johns, but as the Continentals departed, he abandoned this
wild notion and ordered his citizen-soldiers home. Within a few
weeks, cattle-rai ding from East Florida began once more.74
Recrimination naturally followed this third aborted effort
both north and south of the St. Marys River. General Howe returned to Charles ton complaining of uncooperative civilians who
70.

71.
72.
73.
74.

Tonyn to Howe, June 3, 1778, Prevost to Clinton, July 11, 1778, ibid., I,
259, 271-73; Mowat, East Florida, 122; General orders of Samuel Elbert,
June 6, 1778-July 4, 1778, in Collections of the Georgia Historical Society, V, Part 2, 161-75.
Jones, History of Georgia, II, 297; Joseph Habersham to Bella Habersham, July 5, 778, Joseph Habersham Papers, Georgia Historical Society, Savannah.
Howe to William Moultrie, July 5, 1778, quoted in Jones, History of
Georgia, II, 295-96.
Jones, History of Georgia, II, 299-300,
Ibid., 300-02; Mowat, East Florida, 122.
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had “perplexed” affairs in Georgia, while Houstoun and the
militia now regarded Howe an an “interloper” who had faltered
on the invasion. Even so, ridiculous as it may appear, Continental and state forces both spoke of undertaking yet another attempt against St. Augustine in the autumn when the weather
more suited southern operations.75
In the Florida capital, Prevost and Tonyn, the crisis past,
renewed their quarrel over control of the rangers and Brown’s
rank. Prevost declared to his superiors that only the regulars had
saved Brown from defeat at Alligator Bridge; Tonyn intimated
that the rangers had driven back the invaders with some help
76
from Major Prevost’s troops. Before their squabble could reach
its former proportions, however, Sir William Howe and his successor in 1778, Sir Henry Clinton, expressed displeasure at the
difficulty between Prevost and Tonyn. By August, Clinton insisted
that the dispute end and the rangers be established on the same
terms as other provincial forces. Tonyn agreed as he learned of
impending plans for the fall of 1778.77
The British ministry, given the stalemated situation in the
northern colonies, had decided to do what Tonyn had wished
done since 1776, subdue Georgia and the Carolinas and end the
rebellion in the South. Britain’s decision to “roll-up” the war
from the South also ended the divided command on the southern
frontier, though in opposite fashion for the respective parties.
Savannah, the first British objective in the resulting invasion, fell
easily in December 1778 when forces from New York and Florida
moved against it. Its defender, General Howe, had remained at
odds with the Georgia governor until the last. Subsequently, not
a few of the general’s former civilian antagonists revenged themselves by testifying against him at a court of inquiry investigating
the loss of the city.78
75. Howe to Moultrie, December 8, 1778, in William Moultrie, Memoirs of
the American Revolution. . ., 2 vols. (New York, 1802), I, 247; Higginbotham, War of American Independence, 354-55; Jones, History of
Georgia, II, 303; Coleman, American Revolution in Georgia, 108.
76. Prevost to Clinton, September 25, 1778, Brown to Tonyn, June 30, 1778,
Report on American Manuscripts, I, 302, 269.
77. Howe to Prevost, May 1, 1778, Howe to Tonyn, May 1, 1778, Clinton co
Prevost, June 3, August 25, 1778, Clinton to Tonyn, June 3, 1778, Tonyn
to Clinton, September 30, 1778, Report on American Manuscripts, I,
242-43, 258, 282, 305.
78. Mowat, East Florida, 122-23; Coleman, American Revolution in Georgia,
120-21; “Proceedings of a general court martial, held at Philadelphia . . .
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Just as British victory had rendered academic the divided
command between Georgia civil authority and Continental officers, so too had it brought an end to the dispute between Tonyn
and Prevost over the rangers. Clinton had forced a measure of
cooperation between the two when the Georgia operation commenced. With its conclusion, Secretary of State Lord George
Germain instructed Tonyn to surrender control of the rangers to
the British commander in chief for reorganization at his discretion. No longer would they be considered East Florida troops;
henceforth, the rangers would be on the same standing as other
provincial corps of loyalists .79 Accordingly, the very objective
Tonyn had sought cost him his rangers and their special status as
it removed the source of irritation between himself and the
British regulars.
Yet, the governor did get in a last word. When Prevost had to
fall back from Charleston and Beaufort, South Carolina, early in
1779, the governor could scarcely wait to notify Clinton and inf o r m h i m o f rumors that “great discontent” from lax discipline prevailed among Prevost’s troops.80 His enthusiasm to detract from Prevost’s efforts was matched only by the eagerness
with which Georgia militiamen testified against Howe at his
court of inquiry. Consequently, although British victory had
ended divided command on the southern frontier, sufficient evidence of dissension remained to question whether generals or
politicians had learned or forgotten anything from their experience.
If they had not, as Tonyn’s last sneers at Prevost and the glee
of certain Georgians at Howe’s discomfort indicate, they were at
least being true to an ancient tradition that neither began nor
ended with them. Historically, over and again, civil-military
division has flourished and given bloom to accusation and
counter-accusation in wartime. Although division always recedes
with the fading cause, the military, with its “no substitute for
victory,” retains its distrust of politicians; while they, on the
for the trial of Major General Howe, December 7, 1781,” originally published in Philadelphia in 1782, reprinted in Collections of the New York
Historical Society for the Year 1879 (New York, 1880), 213-311.
79. Clinton to Prevost, October 20, 1778, Clinton to Tonyn, October 20, 1778,
Report on American Manuscripts, I, 314.
80. Tonyn to Clinton, July 13, 1779, Report on American Manuscripts, I,
469-70.
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other hand, remain haunted by Clemenceau’s remark on the importance of war. One can only hope, in the historical process, that
timely cooperation will prevail as necessary to prevent either the
disaster of Caesar— or that of Cicero.
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